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Abstract 
Industrial buyers who seek to procure inputs have the option of contracting the process 
out to procurement intermediaries. Many of these intermediaries now operate using 
Internet-based software to enhance the efficiency of their services. We develop a 
theoretical model of a buyer who wishes to procure an input from one of many 
differentiated suppliers. The buyer chooses between conducting the procurement herself 
and hiring a procurement intermediary. We use the model to investigate how and when 
such procurement intermediaries can be profitable, and to generate insight for the design 
of the online procurement process with regard to bidder recruitment and information 
revelation. The model suggests that the profitability of the intermediary relies crucially, 
on its ability to administer and evaluate quotes from potential suppliers more efficiently 
than the buyer can herself. 
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1. Introduction  
Internet technologies often promise industrial buyers and their suppliers substantial transactional 
efficiencies in their sourcing activities.  Many of the top Fortune 50 firms employ online auctions 
to source their inputs. The leading provider of online procurement auctions is FreeMarkets.  
According to its website, since its founding, FreeMarkets has helped customers around the world 
to source more than $40 billion in goods and services in more than 200 different supply 
categories. FreeMarkets rose to fame on the dot-com bandwagon, alongside companies such as 
Commerce One, PuchasePro.com, and Ariba. After the hype subsided, many Internet B-to-B 
intermediaries were forced to fold as they recognized that they provided little real value to 
industrial buyers.  On the other hand, some have become profitable and, as the FreeMarkets case 
illustrates, Internet B-to-B intermediaries can provide a valuable service to industrial buyers. In 
the present paper, we develop a theoretical model to assess the potential for value creation by 
companies who serve as centralized procurement intermediaries and strategies they can use to 
guarantee profitability. We point out, in particular, that such intermediaries may be 
informationally disadvantaged in comparison to the buyer in assessing the extent of fit of 
different suppliers with the buyer’s requirements. Their potential for value creation relies 
crucially, therefore, on their ability to administer and evaluate quotes from potential suppliers 
more efficiently than the buyer can herself. Such enhanced efficiency guarantees that the 
intermediary can secure a larger pool of suppliers as potential candidates to be considered by the 
buyer. 
 Our focus in this research is to understand Internet-based procurement services (also 
referred to as B-to-B intermediaries) as an alternative to traditional supply chain processes. 
Generally, such Internet services exist profitably if they offer transactional efficiencies over 
other procurement methods. However, since there are many sources of transaction costs, it is 
important to learn where specific efficiencies emerge when going online. As such, we fully 
investigate the economic incentives of an industrial buyer’s supply chain activities independent 
of any Internet procurement service. We then evaluate conditions under which the existence of 
such an online procurement intermediary provides a benefit to the industrial buyer over its next 
best procurement alternative.  
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 In the process of identifying potential sources of profitability of online procurement 
intermediaries, we also gain managerial insights, which might help in the design of online 
auctions. For instance, our analysis suggests that such online intermediaries should recruit more 
bidders than an industrial buyer would on her own. In addition, we illustrate how online 
procurement auctions offer an industrial buyer lower bids if bidders are fully informed of their 
degree of fit with the buyer’s specific needs. 
To illustrate the setting of this paper, suppose an automobile manufacturer seeks door 
handles for a particular model of car. The automaker is able to specify certain attributes of the 
door handles, such as dimensions, material, and color, and there are many qualified auto parts 
suppliers who can feasibly meet these specifications. But suppose, in addition, that the 
automaker has preferences over certain quality attributes, which suppliers fit to varying degrees.  
Such supplier-specific attributes might include, for example, workmanship, durability, and style. 
In order to fully evaluate the benefit from contracting with a potential supplier, the automaker 
must individually contact the supplier, obtain a quote, and determine the supplier’s fit with 
respect to these attributes. This, however, is costly, especially if the set of sellers is large1 
because she must search among qualified suppliers and invest in some inspection process. 
Because suppliers are differentiated in this way, industrial buyers often select the supplier on 
other criteria in addition to quoted price. For example, it is not uncommon in the automotive 
industry that a buyer, after viewing all bids from participating parts suppliers, awards the 
contract based on a variety of factors in addition to price.2 Our modeling framework permits 
buyers to choose a supplier on the criterion of total value net of price. 
To evaluate the potential for value creation by the intermediary, we first consider the 
optimal procurement method that the automaker should utilize if searching on her own. She can 
either approach suppliers one by one and evaluate each fit and price sequentially or, 
alternatively, she can approach a number of suppliers and request simultaneous quotes (RFQ). 
Given that contacting and evaluating a given supplier comes at a cost, this issue between search 
methods is non-trivial. Furthermore, the method of search employed by the automaker affects the 
way in which each supplier forms his quote strategy. The automaker must also decide whether to 
reveal information to each potential supplier about his degree of fit with the buyer’s 
                                                 
1 There are reportedly over 30,000 suppliers of parts in the automotive industry (El Sawy, 2001). 
2 According to its website, COVISINT, the online procurement service for the automotive industry, enables 
automakers to award a contract to a supplier based on buyer-subjective attributes in addition to price. 
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requirements. Given that some of those requirements can be subjective, the extent of fit of a 
given supplier is private information that can only be observed by the automaker herself. 
For sequential search, we illustrate that it is in the automaker’s best interest to always 
conceal from each supplier his degree of fit. If she reveals this information, each supplier knows 
the buyer’s true valuation of the contract, thus allowing him to extract the entire surplus of the 
automaker. In contrast, under RFQ, we demonstrate that the automaker should reveal to each 
supplier his degree of fit. When suppliers are uninformed, they bid independently of the extent of 
fit between their products and the buyer’s requirements. In particular, low fit suppliers submit 
similar bids as those submitted by high fit suppliers. However, if each supplier knows his own 
fit, low fitness suppliers reduce their bids in order to remain attractive to the buyer, thus forcing 
high fitness suppliers to compete more aggressively. Such intensified competition benefits the 
automaker. 
When procuring the input on her own, either the sequential search method with 
information concealment or the RFQ method with information revelation can be optimal, 
contingent upon the cost the automaker incurs when inspecting and screening potential suppliers. 
When evaluating the option of contracting out and paying for procurement services, the 
automaker expects her payoff to be at least as high as that she can obtain when searching on her 
own. The procurement intermediary has the potential to enhance the automaker’s payoff only if 
its cost of identifying suppliers, evaluating their qualifications, and processing their quotes in 
lower than that of the automaker herself. One such possible source for enhanced efficiency may 
be the ownership of proprietary software, which permits the intermediary to more efficiently 
contact suppliers and administer the RFQ in the form of an online auction. The existence of the 
Internet makes such an auction easily feasible even if suppliers are in remote parts of the world. 
Since the automaker has an informational advantage over the intermediary in assessing 
supplier-specific attributes, she can more successfully inform suppliers of their extent of fit with 
her requirements. Our analysis predicts, therefore, that the buyer may be able to implement more 
competitive bidding among a given number of suppliers than the intermediary can. Hence, in 
order to remain a viable option for the automaker, the intermediary should compensate for its 
informational disadvantage by recruiting many more suppliers to participate in the auction than 
the number chosen by the automaker, when searching on her own. This task can be accomplished 
only if the intermediary is far more efficient than the automaker in administering the RFQ 
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process. As well, the intermediary can mitigate its informational disadvantage by offering 
additional services to the buyer. FreeMarkets, for instance, offers a very broad set of services and 
activities to its customers that include analysis of spend data, development of supply strategies, 
and sharing of best practice procurement methods, to name a few. The close interaction with the 
customers that such services facilitate allows FreeMarkets to gain better understanding of their 
needs. To guarantee that this improved familiarity with the buyer’s specifications is also shared 
with suppliers, FreeMarkets offers them extensive RFQ support before they submit their bids.3
Others have recognized that there exist strategic considerations in a buyer’s choice of 
procurement process. At a fundamental level, the early works in search have established that 
sequential search is preferable over simultaneous search when the distribution of prices is 
exogenous (DeGroot (1970)). In our setting, price setting by the sellers is endogenous and 
depends on the buyer’s procurement method.  In particular, we demonstrate that by soliciting 
simultaneous bids from suppliers the buyer may induce more aggressive pricing than when 
searching sequentially.  Moreover, by utilizing a mechanism to pre-qualify suppliers the buyer 
can further intensify the extent of competition among them.  Snir and Hitt (2000) have also 
pointed out the importance of such a pre-qualifying mechanism in the procurement of IT 
services.  As in our model, in the market for software development the buyer evaluates bids from 
vendors based upon price as well as her subjective evaluation of the vendors' quality.   
There has also been recent interest in analytical formulations of the B-to-B marketplace.  
Tomak & Xia (2002) and Yoo et al (2003a, 2003b) are studies that develop models with a large 
number of buyers and sellers that interact in the marketplace.  Our setting is different in the sense 
that the online B-to-B intermediary arranges auctions tailored each to the needs of an individual 
buyer.  
More specifically, Tomack and Xia (2002) are interested in analyzing the evolution of B-
to-B exchanges overtime while we focus on the role information plays in determining the sellers' 
bidding behavior in a static model. Yoo et al model (electronic) B-to-B marketplaces to 
investigate the impact of marketplace ownership on the participation decision (Yoo et al 2003b) 
and on pricing (Yoo et al 2003a). In the latter paper, they identify that marketplaces owned by 
one side of the market (‘biased’) might create benefits over independent marketplaces (‘neutral’) 
                                                 
3 See FreeMarkets OnLine, 1998, Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-598-109. It is noteworthy that 
FreeMarkets does not charge suppliers for this RFQ support. Its only source of revenue accrues from buyers. 
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because biased marketplaces better exploit network effects generated by additional participation. 
By their definition, the intermediaries we consider here are neutral. However, our analysis points 
out that, while the intermediary is independent, its profitability is directly tied to the surplus it 
generates for its client, the buyer. 
An important aspect of our investigation concerns the buyer’s decision (or the 
intermediary’s decision on behalf of the buyer) whether to reveal supplier-specific information. 
Other studies have previously identified the importance of information revelation in the design of 
online procurement processes. Beil & Wein (2003) offer a dynamic auction mechanism designed 
to extract sellers’ cost structures and improve the buyer’s share of the transaction. In their paper, 
it is the buyer who suffers from incomplete information.4 In our study, the supplier is 
asymmetrically informed about her own degree of fit with the buyer. Zhu (2002, 2003), more 
generally, considers the impact of information sharing on outcomes in electronic marketplaces 
and identifies that, while sharing information about prices and costs might yield short-term 
benefits to buyers, it might also produce adverse long-run effects by lowering the suppliers’ 
participation incentives.  In contrast to Zhu who assumes that information about the type of 
suppliers or buyers is automatically revealed once they decide to join the exchange, in our 
formulation the buyer (or the intermediary on the buyer's behalf) can strategically reveal 
information to the suppliers.  We stress, in particular, the role of information in governing the 
extent of competition among the suppliers in reverse auctions. 
A couple of relevant institutional studies are also worth mentioning.  El Sawy (2001) and 
Dai and Kauffman (2002) develop, in particular, a conceptual classification of the different B-to-
B exchange organizations.  Using the terminology of Dai and Kauffman (2002), for instance, the 
procurement intermediary in our model can be classified as a "public exchange."  In contrast, the 
administering of the RFQ by the buyer herself can be classified as a "private exchange."
There is also a related literature addressing the role e-commerce plays in retail markets.  
Most of this literature focuses on understanding Internet Shopping Agents (ISA) that allow 
consumers to costlessly search among many online retailers.5  This literature has provided mixed 
                                                 
4 Pinker et al (2003) point out inter alia that existing studies concerning informational asymmetries in procurement 
auctions, like those considered here, focus on supplier costs. (See, for example, Dasgupta & Spulber 1989/1990.) 
Our focus, on the other hand, is on supplier-specific fit attributes known ex ante only by the buyer. 
5 Anand & Aron (2003) identify and investigate another ecommerce retail institution known as ‘Group Buying’ in 
which consumers form co-op type organizations to gain buying power over suppliers. Their focus is on pricing 
strategies of the supplier in such a setting. 
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evidence on the extent of price competition fostered by online retailing.  While Brynjolfsson and 
Smith (2000) and Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) find that online retail markets are 
more price competitive than conventional markets, Ellison and Ellison (2001) demonstrate that 
retailers can adopt obfuscation strategies to increase the search costs of consumers and alleviate, 
as a result, the extent of price competition on ISA's.  Some studies have demonstrated the 
existence of price dispersion (Baye and Morgan (2001, 2002), and Brynjoylfsson and Smith 
(2000)), and others have addressed the role Internet technology plays in facilitating enhanced 
product differentiation or "versioning" (see Bakos (1997, 2001), Varian (2000), and Choudhary, 
Ghose, Mukhopdhyay, and Rajan (2003)). 
 Finally, the RFQ process we model is related to the general theory of auctions, which has 
been extensively explored in the economics literature (Maskin and Riley (1984), McAfee and 
McMillan (1987), and Milgrom and Weber (1982).)  However, the application of this theory in 
the context of reverse auctions on the internet is limited.6 The model we develop in this paper is 
aimed at filling this gap in the literature.  As well, we wish to use the analysis to gain better 
understanding of the underlying "business model" of centralized procurement intermediaries on 
the Internet. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the main assumptions 
of the model. In section 3, we derive the optimal stopping rule for the buyer and the implied 
equilibrium prices chosen by the suppliers when the buyer searches sequentially among sellers. 
In section 4, we derive the equilibrium quote strategy of the suppliers when the buyer utilizes the 
RFQ method to procure the input. In section 5, we evaluate the possibility for value creation by a 
procurement intermediary, and in section 6 summarize the implications of our analysis for 
managers. In section 7 we offer concluding remarks. The appendices contain the proofs of most 
propositions and one possible extension of the basic model. 
2. The Model 
A single downstream firm seeks to procure an input required in its production.  Suppliers vary 
according to the parameter , which measures the extent to which their products constitute 
a good fit with the buyer's requirements.  There is a continuum of suppliers whose "extent of fit" 
[ 1,0∈x ]
                                                 
6 See Pinker et al (2003) for a comprehensive managerial survey of the auction literature applied to online settings. 
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x is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.  If the buyer purchases the input from a supplier of 
type x charging her the price p, her net utility is given as follows: 
 . (1) ( ) pmxpxv −=,
Hence, the parameter m measures the emphasis the buyer places on obtaining the input from a 
supplier whose product specifications match the buyer's requirements.7 For simplicity, we 
normalize the costs of production of suppliers to be equal to zero. 
 The buyer is considering two different methods for procuring the input. Under the first, 
she conducts an optimal search among potential suppliers. We assume that the cost of identifying 
a new supplier, negotiating a price with him, and evaluating the extent to which his product fits 
the buyer’s specification is . Using results obtained in the literature, we know that to guarantee 
optimality, the buyer should utilize an appropriately selected “stopping rule” while sampling 
sequentially among potential suppliers. (See DeGroot (1970), Lippman & McCall (1976), 
McCall (1970), Mirman & Porter (1974), and Rothchild (1974) as examples.) Alternatively, the 
buyer can solicit quotes from suppliers in the form of a request for quotations (RFQ). After 
suppliers submit quotes simultaneously, the buyer compares the quotes as well as the extent of fit 
of the different suppliers to choose the supplier who offers her the highest net payoff. The cost to 
the buyer of choosing a supplier via the RFQ method depends on her scrutiny in screening 
suppliers who are allowed to participate in the bidding as well as upon the extent of outreach of 
the RFQ, as measured by the number of suppliers  who are solicited to submit bids. We 
formulate the scrutiny of screening suppliers in the form of a minimum level of fitness , where 
only those suppliers whose fitness exceeds this threshold level are allowed to participate in the 
bidding. 
k
n
xˆ
 Implementing the scrutiny level  may require that the buyer formulates the RFQ in a 
manner aimed at attracting only qualified suppliers of type . It also requires that the buyer 
establish a preliminary evaluation procedure to screen the eligible suppliers
xˆ
xx ˆ≥
8. This evaluation 
process need not be so rigorous that it can establish the exact type x  of each supplier. Rather, it 
only verifies whether the type falls in the required range ]1,ˆ[xx∈ . We designate by  ),ˆ( nxTCB
                                                 
7 This utility specification is similar to that used in earlier models of quality competition. (See, for instance, 
Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979) or Gal-Or (1985).) 
8 Snir and Hitt (2000) have also discussed the advantages of utilizing a preliminary mechanism aimed at pre-
qualifying suppliers in the IT professional service market. 
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the cost to the buyer of procuring the input using the RFQ method.9 We assume that this cost 
function is convex and increasing in both of its arguments. A higher value of  implies that the 
buyer must allocate more resources to identify suppliers whose product specifications abide more 
closely with her requirements. Similarly, it is more costly for the buyer to search for a larger 
number of qualified suppliers. Note that when the buyer does not impose any restrictions on 
suppliers who can participate in the bidding, so that 
xˆ
0ˆ =x , her costs  are simply , 
which corresponds to the cost of inspecting the exact specifications of the products of the  
suppliers. 
),0( nTC nk
n
 For each of the two methods to procure the input, the buyer can consider two different 
regimes. Under the first, Information Concealment Regime, the buyer guarantees that when 
suppliers set prices they cannot fully assess the extent of fit of their products with the buyer’s 
specifications. Hence, with the sequential search method, the buyer ensures that in negotiating 
with each supplier, she does not reveal information about the supplier’s type x . As a result, the 
supplier knows only that the extent of fit of his product is drawn from a uniform distribution on 
the unit interval, without being able to precisely assess the value of x .  
 With the RFQ method, the Information Concealment Regime dictates that the buyer 
intentionally withholds information about her exact specifications even if she can clearly 
articulate them in the RFQ. As a consequence, a supplier knows that his type, as well as those of 
his competitors in the bidding exceed the threshold  without being able to exactly infer where 
in this range his type falls. 
xˆ
 Under the second regime, the Information Revelation Regime, each supplier is aware of 
his type x  when setting the price of his product. When the buyer searches sequentially, this 
information is intentionally revealed by the buyer when negotiating with each supplier. When the 
buyer uses the RFQ method, she makes an effort to describe very precisely her requirements so 
that each supplier can perfectly infer his type. As a result, when each supplier submits his quote, 
he is familiar with his type but not with those of his competitors in the bidding. 
                                                 
9 Note that the arguments of the cost function )(⋅BTC  are decision variables to be selected optimally by the buyer. 
The exogenous parameter  that reflects the importance the buyer places on fit, affects this optimal choice. m
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 The different information that is available to suppliers under the two regimes has 
implications on their pricing behavior.10 Under the first regime, when suppliers are uninformed 
about x , their prices cannot be contingent upon the value of x , thus . In contrast, under 
the second regime, when suppliers become familiar with 
+ℜ∈p
x  while negotiating with the buyer or 
interpreting the RFQ, their prices are chosen as functions of x , so that . Note 
also that the pricing behavior of the suppliers will depend upon the method utilized by the buyer 
to procure the input.
+ℜ→]1,0[:)(xp
11
 We formulate the game as consisting of two stages. In the first, the buyer decides on the 
method to procure the input (sequential search versus RFQ) as well as on the extent of 
information to be revealed to suppliers (concealment versus revelation). If the buyer chooses the 
RFQ method, she also chooses at this stage the screening parameter  and the outreach 
parameter n . In the second stage, suppliers set prices and the buyer executes her choice. She 
either starts sampling sequentially among suppliers in a manner derived in the sequel, or solicits 
quotes from a group of n  qualified suppliers. In the latter case, those suppliers submit their bids 
and the buyer chooses the one who offers her the highest net payoff. 
xˆ
3. Sequential Search 
3.1 Information Concealment Regime 
Based upon the results obtained in the literature on search, the optimal sequential search is 
characterized by a “stopping rule” that guides the buyer in determining whether to stop sampling 
suppliers. This stopping rule requires that at every stage of the search, the buyer evaluates 
whether the highest net payoff she can obtain from the suppliers sampled so far exceeds a certain 
threshold level that she derives optimally. If it does, the buyer stops sampling and purchases the 
input from this supplier. Consider first the case that all suppliers charge the same price p . Given 
this symmetry, the buyer formulates her search in terms of a critical acceptable level of fitness 
                                                 
10 A more natural regime to consider is an intermediate case between the two extremes mentioned above.  
Specifically, it is reasonable to assume that each supplier can observe a noisy signal of x and condition his pricing on 
the value of this signal.  Similar to the first regime mentioned above, in this intermediate case as well, the buyer is 
better informed than each supplier about the extent of fit of the supplier. See Appendix 2. 
11 In the optimal search literature, the standard assumption is that the distribution of prices is exogenous, and 
determined independently of the search method of the consumer. In contrast, the searching agent in our model is a 
monopsonist, whose procurement method significantly affects the suppliers’ pricing strategies and, as a result, the 
distribution of prices from which the buyer samples. 
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*x . At a given stage in the sampling, let supplier i  be of the highest fitness level from all of 
those sampled so far. In order for this supplier to be chosen (i.e. ) the following inequality 
should hold. 
*xxi ≥
 ( )( ) ( ) kpmxxpxxxmExpmx iiiii −−+−≥−≥− ]|[1 . 
The LHS of the above inequality designates the net payoff of the buyer when purchasing from i  
given that this supplier is of type . The RHS measures the expected payoff of the buyer when 
continuing to search for another supplier. This supplier may end up being of a higher type than 
 (with probability ). In this case, the buyer purchases from him since this newly sampled 
supplier is now considered the best and his fitness parameter lies in the acceptable region. 
Alternatively, the newly sampled supplier may be of a lower type than  (with probability ), 
in which case supplier i  continues to be the best among those sampled. The buyer returns then to 
supplier  since his fitness value exceeds the minimal acceptable level . Irrespective of the 
outcome of the continued search, the buyer must incur the extra search cost . The minimal 
acceptable level  is derived by substituting  and solving the above expression as an 
equality.
ix
ix ix−1
ix ix
i *x
k
*x *xxi =
12
 Next, suppose that supplier  deviates slightly from the symmetric equilibriumi 13 by 
charging the price , and let  be the common price charged by all suppliers other than i . This 
deviation causes the buyer to re-calculate the minimal acceptable fitness level when evaluating 
supplier . Designate this level by . Supplier i  will be chosen (i.e. ) if the following 
inequality holds: 
ip pˆ
i *ix
*
ii xx ≥
( )( ) ( ) kpmxxpxxxmExpmx iiiiiii −−+−≥−≥− ~ˆ]~|[~1 ,    (2) 
where 
m
ppxx iii
−+≡ ˆ~ . 
                                                 
12 It can be directly shown that mkx /21* −= . 
13 We focus on the derivation of symmetric interior equilibria. For the derivation of such equilibria, it is sufficient 
that we consider only small deviations from the common equilibrium price. As a result, even when the buyer can 
costlessly observe the prices of suppliers and, possibly, exclude from inspection some suppliers due to their high 
prices she does not find it optimal to drop supplier i. Since this supplier deviates only slightly from the common 
price charged by all his competitors the buyer still finds it optimal to incur the cost k necessary in order to inspect 
his qualifications. 
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The interpretation of the RHS of (2) is very similar to that discussed earlier. If the buyer samples 
one additional supplier, he may offer her a higher net payoff than i  if his type exceeds ix~  (with 
probability ix~1− ). In that case, the buyer purchases the input from him. Otherwise, she returns to 
supplier  who is considered acceptable (given that ). Inequality (2) can be rewritten as 
follows 
i *ii xx ≥
 
i
ii x
kxxxmExm ~1
]~|[~ −−≥≥ .        (3) 
To find the minimal acceptable level, solve (3) as an equality to obtain: mkxi /21~ −= . From 
the definition of ix~  it follows that  
 
m
pp
m
kx ii
−−−= ˆ21* .        (4) 
 Note that supplier i  can affect the “stopping rule” used by the buyer when evaluating 
him. Specifically, by charging a lower price than all of his competitors the supplier increases the 
probability that he will be selected by the buyer. The probability of him being selected is equal to 
, which increases when  decreases. Conditional on being the most favored supplier so 
far, the expected revenues of i  are given by  and the supplier chooses his price to 
maximize these expected revenues. The result of this maximization yields the following 
proposition. 
*1 ix− ip
ii px )1(
*−
 
Proposition 1 At the symmetric price equilibrium when sellers are uninformed about 
their types, the buyer searches sequentially14 among suppliers if 8mk ≤ . She continues to 
sample until she identifies a supplier whose fit exceeds , where 
 
*x
m
kx 21* −= .          (5) 
If 8mk > ,  the buyer does not conduct any search and withdraws from the market. 
                                                 
14 The literature on optimal sequential search has established that for an exogenous distribution of prices, a 
consumer is better off sampling sequentially among suppliers rather than inspecting simultaneously a specified 
number  of suppliers. (See, for instance, DeGroot (1970), Chapter 13.) 1>n
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(i) The common price charged by the suppliers at such an equilibrium is: 
 kmp 2=          (6) 
(ii) The expected profit of each supplier is: 
 kE 2=π          (7) 
and the expected payoff of the buyer is: 
 kmmEv 22−= .        (8) 
 
 According to Proposition 1, the buyer actively searches among suppliers only if the cost 
of search  is sufficiently small. If , the buyer cannot benefit from participating in the 
market, since the input prices she anticipates combined with her high costs of search render 
production unprofitable. Notice that in the region where search does take place, the threshold fit 
level exceeds ½, implying that only if the supplier’s type is higher than the mean of the 
population the buyer will consider purchasing the input from him. Moreover, the threshold level 
increases when search costs are smaller and /or the buyer places greater emphasis on obtaining a 
good fit between the input type and the specification of her product (i.e. smaller  and bigger  
values). A bigger threshold implies that the buyer is more selective, thus inducing fiercer price 
competition among the suppliers. Notice that the common price set by the suppliers at the 
symmetric equilibrium is always lower than the price a monopolist supplier would choose (i.e. 
from (6)  when ).
k 8/mk >
k m
2/mp ≤ 8/mk ≤ 15
3.2 Information Revelation Regime 
When the buyer chooses to inform the supplier about his type while negotiating with him, the 
supplier can choose his price to be contingent upon his extent of fit x .  Let  designate the 
schedule chosen by all other suppliers except i . Continued search by the buyer may benefit her if 
she can identify an alternative supplier who offers her a higher net payoff.  Assuming that this 
net payoff is a nondecreasing function of x (i.e., 
)(ˆ ⋅p
)(ˆ)(ˆ xpmxxv −≡  is nondecreasing), we can 
                                                 
15 A monopolistic supplier who chooses the price  obtains a market share equal to p mp /1− . To maximize its 
profits, it chooses  to maximize , yielding p )/1( mpp − 2/mp =  as the optimal price. 
 12
derive a condition similar to (2) guaranteeing that the buyer is better off buying from supplier i 
rather than continuing to search.16 This condition is expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] kxpmxxdttpx
xmxxpmx iiii
xi
i
iiii
i
−−+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−
+−≥− ∫ ~ˆ~1 12
~1~1)(
1
~
  , (9) 
where )]([ˆ~ 1 iii xpmxvx −= − . 
The interpretation of inequality (9) is very similar to that of (2) with the only difference being 
that the price chosen by the supplier is a function rather than a scalar.  Inequality (9) implies that 
in order to maximize his revenues, supplier i  should choose his price schedule just high enough 
to satisfy (9) as an equality. Doing so guarantees that the supplier charges the highest possible 
price while still inducing the buyer to purchase the input from him. Setting (9) as an equality 
while evaluating it at the symmetric equilibrium, so that )()(ˆ)( xpxpxpi == , 
, and )()(ˆ)( xvxvxvi == ii xx =~ , yields the following characterization of the common price 
chosen by the suppliers: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ =−−−−+−
1
0
11
1
2
1
x x
kdttp
x
xpxm .     (10) 
Equation (10) is a differential equation that can be solved for )(⋅p . In Proposition 2, we 
characterize this solution assuming that the net payoff of the buyer is a monotone function of x ; 
specifically, that the derivative of the function )()( xpmxxv −=  never changes its sign. 
 
Proposition 2 When each supplier can observe his own fit parameter when setting his 
price the buyer chooses to withdraw from the market since each supplier prices to extract the 
entire surplus of the buyer. Specifically, conditional on being inspected by the buyer, the 
supplier practices first degree price discrimination by choosing the price schedule 
. As a result, the buyer cannot attain a positive net payoff from search. mxxp =)(
 
 According to Proposition 2, the buyer should never inform the supplier about his extent 
of fit if she chooses to procure the input through search. Equipped with this information, the 
                                                 
16 The function  need not be nondecreasing for all values of x.  Even though mx is increasing with 
x, if  is increasing at a rate faster than  the net payoff function may decrease. 
)(ˆ)(ˆ xpmxxv −≡
)(ˆ xp m
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supplier can emulate a perfectly discriminating monopolist. Given the sequential nature of the 
search, the buyer deals with each supplier one at a time. In this monopoly-monopsony 
relationship, transferring information from the buyer to the supplier improves the leverage of the 
latter, thus allowing him to set prices in a manner that extracts the buyer’s surplus. A comparison 
of Propositions 1 and 2 yields the following result. 
 
Corollary 1 If the buyer chooses to procure the input through search she should 
conceal information from suppliers so that they cannot infer their extent of fit with the 
buyer’s requirements. 
 
4. RFQ 
4.1 Information Concealment Regime 
As discussed earlier, the RFQ method is characterized by two parameters: the number of 
participating suppliers, n , and the scrutiny parameter,  that determines the definition of what 
constitutes a qualified supplier. The cost of the RFQ method increases in both of those 
parameters. Under the information concealment regime, the buyer withholds information from 
suppliers about her exact requirements, thus preventing them from assessing precisely the extent 
to which their products meet those requirements. Suppliers know, however, the scrutiny 
parameter selected by the buyer either since the RFQ reveals some information about this choice 
or because they can rationally predict what level of scrutiny is optimal for the buyer (suppliers 
can solve the maximization problem of the buyer to figure out the value of ). Hence, when 
submitting quotes, suppliers know that only those fitness types greater than  participate in the 
bidding. They do not know, however, their exact type 
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
x . In the absence of such information, 
each supplier chooses his price as a scalar, independent of x  (i.e. ). +ℜ∈p
 We focus, once again, on the derivation of symmetric equilibria where all suppliers 
submit identical bids.  To derive the equilibrium, designate by  the bid submitted by a 
representative supplier and by  the common bid submitted by all other suppliers except i.  
Supplier i is the winner of the bidding if his type  combined with his bid  guarantees the 
highest net payoff to the buyer.  Specifically, if: 
ip
pˆ
ix ip
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  for pmxpmx jii ˆ−≥− ij ≠ . 
Restricting attention to the case that the buyer selects to solicit bids from at least two suppliers,17 
so that , the probability of the above event is  2≥n
 ( ) 1
1
ˆ1
ˆˆ
allˆ
ˆ
Pr −
−
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ≠≥−+≤ n
n
i
i
j
i
ij x
x
m
ppx
ijxx
m
ppxx . 
 Supplier i chooses his bid without knowing exactly his type .  Hence, the bid chosen 
by i maximizes his expected payoff expressed as follows: 
ix
 ( )∫ −
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+
=
−
1
ˆ
1
ˆ1
ˆˆ
x
in
n
i
i
ii dxx
x
m
ppx
pEπ . (11) 
 Optimizing the above payoff function with respect to , yields the results reported in 
Proposition 3.  
ip
 
Proposition 3 If the buyer solicits bids from  suppliers, utilizes the scrutiny parameter 
, and conceals information from suppliers about their types, the common bid submitted by 
the suppliers at the symmetric equilibrium is 
n
xˆ
( )
n
xmppp i
ˆ1ˆ −==≡ .        (12) 
The expected payoff of each supplier at this equilibrium is: 
 ( )
2
ˆ1
n
xmE −=π ,         (13) 
and the expected payoff of the buyer is 
 ( )( )( ) ),ˆ(1 1ˆ1ˆ
2
nxTC
nn
nnxmxmEv B−+
−−−+= ,      (14) 
 
 According to Proposition 3, suppliers compete more aggressively the bigger is the 
number of participating suppliers and the more selective the intermediary is in approving 
suppliers to participate in the bidding. In order to win the bid, each supplier has to submit a lower 
                                                 
17 The case in which  can be easily analyzed as well. However, since there is no meaningful bidding behavior 
when only one bidder submits a quote, we omit this case to simplify the discussion. 
1=n
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quote if he knows that there is a bigger number of competing suppliers whose product 
specifications are better aligned with the buyer's requirements.  Hence, bigger values of  and n 
result in lower expected profits of the suppliers. The buyer, in contrast, may benefit from 
choosing bigger values of  and n . First, she is more likely to procure an input that is closely 
aligned with her needs, and second, such a choice induces more aggressive pricing by the 
suppliers. 
xˆ
xˆ
4.2 Information Revelation Regime 
When the buyer shares with the suppliers information about her exact requirements, each 
supplier can infer his type and choose his bid contingent upon x.  Let )(⋅ip  designate the price 
schedule selected by a representative supplier i, and let )(ˆ ⋅p  designate the price schedule 
selected at the equilibrium by all suppliers other than i.  As well, designate by  the net 
payoff function of the buyer when obtaining the input from a supplier different than i whose fit 
parameter is x.  Hence,  
( )xvˆ
)(ˆ)(ˆ xpmxxv −= . 
The buyer will purchase the input from  if the following inequality holds: i
}),(ˆmax{)( ijxvxpmx jiii ≠≥− . 
Assuming that the net payoff function )(ˆ ⋅v  is nondecreasing, the probability that the buyer 
prefers i  to all other suppliers is given as [ ]{ } 11 )ˆ1/(ˆ))((ˆ −− −−− niii xxxpmxv . Hence, the expected 
payoff of supplier  can be expressed as follows: i
 
[ ]
( ) 1
11
ˆ1
ˆ))((ˆ)()( −
−−
−
−−= n
n
iiiii
ii x
xxpmxvxpxEπ ,      (15) 
and the supplier chooses his price schedule to maximize the above payoff function. The result of 
this maximization is reported in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4 When the buyer guarantees that each supplier can infer his own type the 
price schedule selected by each supplier at the symmetric equilibrium is given by: 
 ( )
n
xxmxpxpxp i
ˆ
)(ˆ)()( −==≡ .       (16) 
The expected payoff of each supplier at such an equilibrium is: 
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 ( )( )1
ˆ1
+
−=
nn
xmEπ ,         (17) 
and the expected payoff of the buyer is given as: 
 ( )( )( ) ),ˆ(1
1ˆ1ˆ nxTC
n
nxmxmEv B−+
−−+= .      (18) 
 
 Similar to the results reported in Proposition 3, the above proposition states that the RFQ 
method with information revelation yields more aggressive pricing by suppliers when the 
scrutiny parameter and the number of suppliers that participate in the bidding increase. As a 
result, the expected profits of suppliers decline when  or  are bigger. A comparison of (18) 
with (14) implies that the expected payoff of the buyer rises with information revelation. 
Specifically, from (12) and (16) it follows that informed suppliers compete more aggressively 
than uniformed suppliers when the buyer uses the RFQ method. As a result, the Information 
Revelation Regime yields lower expected profits to suppliers and a higher expected payoff to the 
buyer than the Information Concealment Regime.
xˆ n
18  
When the bid submitted by each supplier is chosen contingent upon the value of x, the 
price schedule is strictly increasing.  Hence, any supplier who realizes that the specifications of 
his product are very different from those required by the buyer lowers his bid in order to remain 
attractive to the buyer.  Such an anticipated adjustment on the part of his competitors implies that 
it is more difficult for each supplier to win the bidding than in an environment where prices of 
competitors remain constant. Suppliers are forced, therefore, to reduce the overall level of their 
prices, thus making the Information Revelation Regime a more competitive environment for 
suppliers.  The comparison of the two regimes in the RFQ method is very different from that in 
the buyer search model, considered in the previous section.   
                                                 
18 Even though we only consider the possibility that the buyer fully informs all the suppliers under the RFQ method 
our model can be extended to allow for partial sharing of information.  Partial sharing can be implemented, for 
instance, if the buyer decides probabilistically on whether to share with the suppliers the buyer's requirements.  One 
such probabilistic choice model that does not affect our derivations is when the intermediary chooses with a certain 
probability α  to inform all the suppliers and with probability  to inform none.  As a result, with probability )1( α−
α  suppliers follow the pricing rule (16) and with the remaining probability  they follow the pricing rule 
(12).  Price competition intensifies and the buyer's payoff increases as 
)1( α−
α  increases, implying that the buyer will find 
it optimal to choose 1=α .  In future research, we plan to consider alternative models of partial sharing of 
information.  For instance, the buyer may choose to inform only a subset of suppliers, or she may decide on whether 
to inform one supplier independent of her choice with respect to competing suppliers. 
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When the buyer searches sequentially among suppliers she is disadvantaged if suppliers 
can observe their types.  In fact, suppliers can exercise first degree price discrimination, in this 
case, and extract the entire surplus of the buyer.  In contrast, if the buyer uses the RFQ method, 
informing each supplier about his type induces him to actually compete more aggressively, thus 
benefiting the buyer.  We summarize the above comparison in Proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5 If the buyer searches sequentially among suppliers she is better off if 
suppliers are unaware of her exact requirements.  In contrast, if the buyer uses the RFQ method 
to procure the input and , the buyer benefits by informing each participating supplier of her 
exact requirements. 
2≥n
In view of the results reported in Proposition 5, we can now compare the expected payoff 
of the buyer when using the two different methods to procure the input. If the buyer searches 
sequentially, her expected payoff is given by (8) in Proposition 1 since she does not reveal 
information to suppliers in this case. If the buyer uses the RFQ method, her expected payoff is 
given by (18) in Proposition 4 since she does find it optimal to share information with suppliers 
in this case. We start by conducting the comparison when 0ˆ =x , namely when the buyer does 
not screen suppliers who are allowed to participate in the bidding. In the absence of screening, 
the cost of the RFQ method is simply , which corresponds to the cost of sampling 
simultaneously  different suppliers. In the literature on optimal search, it has been established 
that sequential search using the “stopping rule” approach is superior to the sampling and 
simultaneous inspection of  observations from the population. However, this result was derived 
under the assumption that the distribution of prices in the population is exogenously determined, 
independent of the search rule selected by the decision maker. In our environment, the buyer is a 
monopsonist whose search method affects the extent of price competition among suppliers. It is 
unclear, therefore, which procurement method is preferable to the buyer. We report the results of 
the comparison when  in Proposition 6, and restrict this comparison to the case that 
 to guarantee that sequential search is a viable option to the buyer. 
kn
n
n
0ˆ =x
8/mk ≤
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 Proposition 6  Suppose  and define 8/mk ≤
)1(
]122[2
2 +
+−+≡
nn
nnmkL   and )1(
]122[2
2 +
+++≡
nn
nnmkH . 
(i) When , the buyer prefers sequential search over RFQ without any initial screening 
of suppliers (i.e. ) provided that 
5≤n
0ˆ =x Lkk ≤ . Otherwise, if 8/mkkL ≤<  the RFQ 
method generates higher profits to the buyer. 
(ii) When , the buyer prefers the sequential search method if either  or 
. Otherwise, if 
6≥n Lkk ≤
8/mkkH ≤< HL kkk <<  the RFQ method is the preferable choice of the 
buyer. 
 
The parameter  that measures the cost of sampling and inspecting a single supplier 
determines the relative profitability of the two procurement methods. Higher costs result in less 
intensified price competition among suppliers under sequential search, implying that the RFQ 
method may be more advantageous to the buyer in this case. However, higher values of  imply 
also that the overall costs of search are higher under RFQ than under sequential search. The 
expected number of observations sampled under sequential search equals , which is 
smaller than  if  is sufficiently large. 
k
k
)1/(1 *x−
n k
The results reported in Proposition 6 characterize regions of the parameter  over which 
one of the above mentioned counteracting effects dominates. When  is relatively small (less 
than or equal to 5) the sequential search method dominates for small values of . In essence, 
small values of  guarantee sufficiently aggressive competition among suppliers under 
sequential search. When  is relatively large (6 or larger), sequential search dominates either for 
very low or for very high values of . RFQ dominates for intermediate values of . 
k
n
k
k
n
k k
If the buyer chooses the RFQ method she selects the parameters  and  to maximize 
her expected payoff in (18). Ignoring the integer constraint on n  yields the following two first 
order conditions to determine the optimal values of  and : 
xˆ n
xˆ n
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If the cost function  is separable in its two arguments (for instance, 
), then the above two first order conditions imply that the parameters  
and  are substitutes. Specifically, if the buyer chooses to recruit additional suppliers to 
participate in the bidding she finds it optimal to reduce the extent of scrutiny is screening them 
and vice-versa. 
),ˆ( nxTCB
=),ˆ( nxTCB 2/ˆ 2xkn α+ xˆ
n
 If the solution to (19) is an interior equilibrium, so that , the comparison between 
the two procurement methods is more complicated, since larger values of  increase both the 
costs and the expected benefit of the RFQ method. It is unclear, therefore, whether the regions of 
relative dominance reported in Proposition 6 remain qualitatively similar. Different values of the 
parameter k  are likely to still introduce counteracting effects in determining which method 
dominates. 
0ˆ >x
xˆ
 The above derivations imply that the buyer has to consider both procurement methods in 
deciding which one to employ. She chooses the one that guarantees her the higher net expected 
payoff. Designate by  the expected net payoff of the buyer when using the RFQ method, 
which incorporates the optimal choice of the parameters  and  that solve (19) as well as full 
disclosure of information to each supplier about his type. Similarly, let  designate the 
buyer’s expected net payoff by using optimal sequential search, which involves concealment of 
information from suppliers. As a result, the overall expected net payoff of the buyer can be 
expressed as 
*
RFQEv
xˆ n
*
SSEv
},max{ *SS
*
RFQ
* EvEvEv = .        (20) 
5. Online Procurement Intermediary 
As an alternative to procuring the input herself, the buyer can hire the services of an intermediary 
who uses, for example, proprietary Internet-based software to execute reverse-auctions on behalf 
of the buyer. By using the Internet, the intermediary provides efficiency gains by reducing the 
cost of administering the RFQ process. One source of efficiency gains is for the improved ability 
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of communicating with suppliers regarding essential transaction details. (See Lucking-Riley & 
Spulber (2001) for other sources of efficiency gains.)  
Similar to the RFQ method considered in the previous section, the quality of the service 
provided by the intermediary can also be characterized in terms of two parameters: a threshold 
level of fit  used by the intermediary to screen eligible suppliers and the number of suppliers n  
who are identified as being appropriate to participate in the auction. We designate the costs of 
the intermediary as , and assume this cost function to be convex and increasing in its 
two arguments. 
xˆ
),ˆ( nxTCI
 The derivations conducted in the previous sections can help us assess the extent to which 
the intermediary can offer value to the buyer. As in the RFQ method, the values of the 
parameters  and  determine the extent of competition among suppliers in the auction. 
Moreover, bigger values guarantee that the buyer is more likely to find a good fit with her 
requirements. In fact, we can use (14) and (18) to express the expected payoffs that the 
intermediary can generate for the buyer gross of her payment to the intermediary: 
xˆ n
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 The ability of the intermediary to offer a valuable service to the buyer depends upon the 
costs it has to incur in order to generate the above gross payoff. Hence, in understanding the 
relationship between the buyer and the intermediary it is essential to conduct a comparison 
between the cost functions  and )(⋅ITC )(⋅BTC . Given that the attribute x  might not be easily 
specified, it is likely that the buyer would have an advantage over the intermediary in screening 
suppliers according to the minimum threshold . Since the buyer is more familiar with her own 
preferences, she can implement any desired scrutiny level at a lower cost than the intermediary 
can. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the marginal cost of increased scrutiny is lower for 
the buyer than for the intermediary. Specifically, 
xˆ
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 Similarly, the intermediary may be at a disadvantage, in comparison to the buyer, in 
implementing the Information Revelation Regime. Given that it is difficult for the buyer to 
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articulate her preferences with respect to the attribute x , the intermediary may have difficulties 
in revealing to suppliers their exact fit with the buyers’ requirements.19 As a result, the 
intermediary may not be able to generate for the buyer the higher expected payoff feasible when 
suppliers bid in the auction equipped with full information about their own types. 
 In contrast to its information disadvantage, the intermediary may have a significant cost 
advantage in recruiting suppliers to participate in the auction. The software developed by e-
sourcing intermediaries takes advantage of the global reach of the Internet to identify many more 
potential suppliers than the buyer could solicit on her own. As a result, it is likely that the 
marginal cost of recruiting additional suppliers to participate in the auction is higher for the 
buyer than for the intermediary. Hence, we assume that  
 
n
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∂ ),ˆ(),ˆ( . 
 Given the bilateral nature of the relationship between buyer and intermediary, we assume 
that the parties agree on the terms of the transaction between them, via negotiations.20 In the 
negotiations, they choose a mutually acceptable rule to share the added value generated by the 
intermediary (if positive). This added value depends upon the ability of the intermediary to 
implement the Information Revelation Regime. Specifically, the added value is given by 
, which corresponds to the difference between the expected value the intermediary 
can generate for the buyer by administering the on-line auction and the payoff the buyer can 
generate on her own. Assuming that the parties agree to split the contribution of the intermediary 
at a rate 
*EvEGV −
β  to the intermediary and β−1  to the buyer, the intermediary chooses  and  to 
maximize the following objective:  
xˆ n
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 If the buyer assists the intermediary in informing the suppliers about their types, so that 
the Information Revelation Regime is feasible, then the objective in (21) indicates that the 
                                                 
19 FreeMarkets tries to create a very close relationship with its customers, in the form of a broad set of additional 
services, in order to better understand their needs. 
20 See Yoo et al (2003a) for discussion of specific pricing strategies. Our negotiations set-up abstracts away from 
this issue in order to focus on informational design and other profitability factors. 
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intermediary chooses a lower scrutiny level in screening suppliers than the buyer does when she 
chooses the RFQ method.21 Since the intermediary obtains a fraction β  of the benefit from 
increased scrutiny whereas the buyer internalizes the full benefit, and since the marginal cost of 
increased scrutiny is higher for the intermediary than it is for the buyer, the intermediary chooses 
a lower value of . As far as the incentives to recruit suppliers, three different effects should be 
recognized. First, on the negative side, the intermediary can capture only a fraction 
xˆ
β  of the 
benefit from increasing n , whereas the buyer internalizes the full benefit, implying the existence 
of reduced incentives to recruit suppliers. However, on the positive side, since the level of 
scrutiny and the number of participants in the auction are substitutes in generating value for the 
buyer, the lower scrutiny level selected by the intermediary implies that it has stronger incentives 
to increase the number of participants. Moreover, its lower marginal cost of recruiting suppliers 
provides the intermediary with an additional reason to include a bigger number of suppliers in 
the auction than the buyer does when she uses the RFQ method to procure the input. 
 To resolve the ambiguity in comparing the incentives of the intermediary and the buyer, 
consider the following specification of the cost function:  
2ˆ)2/(),ˆ( xnknxTC iii α+= , where IBi ,= ,  
IB kk >  and IB αα < . 
Assuming that the intermediary can implement the Information Revelation Regime, the above 
specification yields the following solutions for  and : xˆ n
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It is easy to show that the above solution implies that BI xx ˆˆ <  and . Hence, the 
intermediary substitutes for a lower level of scrutiny with a larger number of participants in the 
auction. 
BI nn >
                                                 
21 Note that the buyer has strong incentives to assist the intermediary in informing the suppliers since doing so 
increases the added value generated by the intermediary and, as a result, the expected payoff of the buyer. (She 
obtains a fraction β−1  of the increased added value.) 
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 The intermediary will survive in the market only if the overall payoff it can generate 
exceeds the payoff the buyer can generate on her own. Combining the expected payoff of the 
intermediary and buyer yields the following overall payoff generated by the intermediary: 
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where  solves (22). If the buyer uses the RFQ method to procure the input on her own the 
overall payoff she generates amounts to  
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where  solves (22). The intermediary survives in the market only if , which 
essentially implies that the intermediary can sufficiently increase the number of participants in 
the auction to compensate for the reduced scrutiny it exercises in screening suppliers. 
Bn BI WW >
 If the intermediary is unable to implement the Information Revelation Regime, it is more 
difficult for it to remain attractive to the buyer since the overall value it can generate declines 
when suppliers remain uninformed about their types. To guarantee its survival, in this case, its 
marginal cost of identifying additional suppliers, as measured by , should be especially small 
(in comparison to ) to guarantee that it finds it optimal to include many more suppliers than 
the buyer does on her own. 
Ik
Bk
6. Managerial Implications 
It is useful to summarize the implications of the previous analysis for IT firms who are involved 
in online procurement processes or develop IT products for the online auctions. These points 
might also be of interest to any industrial buyer who considers using an online intermediary for 
her procurement process. 
 Internet services involved in e-commerce, such as online procurement service firms, are 
profitable, in general, if they reduce transaction costs relative to traditional dealing. However, 
transaction costs savings come in many forms (see Pinker et al, 2003) and it is important for 
Internet firms to know their advantage in this area. Our analysis suggests that an online 
procurement service can be profitable through its lower cost in administering large numbers of 
bidders relative to the buyer herself. Sources of such cost advantages come in several forms. For 
instance, Moai Technologies provides auction systems, known as CompleteSource, that allow 
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buyers to negotiate bid terms online, which improves the buyers ability to deal with a larger 
number of suppliers who might be, otherwise, not considered. And, as discussed previously, 
FreeMarkets develops proprietary software that facilitates efficient real-time bidding with a large 
number of suppliers. 
 An important design parameter for the procurement process is the scrutiny level, or the 
lower bound for suppliers’ degree of fit with the buyer (the  parameter in our analysis). Since 
this is dependent on the buyer’s specific needs, the buyer is more likely to have better ability 
than the intermediary to screen potential suppliers. Despite this disadvantage, the analysis of the 
previous section suggests that the intermediary can remain a beneficial alternative to the buyer 
by exploiting its real advantage in the administration of a large number of buyers. The analysis 
suggests, furthermore, that any improvement in the intermediary’s ability to screen potential 
suppliers will further enhance its potential to offer the buyer savings in its procurement process. 
Online services such as FreeMarkets, for example, tries to create a very close relationship with 
its customers, in the form of a broad set of additional services, in order to better understand their 
needs.
xˆ
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 Finally, our analysis has an important implication regarding the informational design of 
the online auction. The intermediary can induce more competitive bidding by informing 
suppliers of their degree of fit with the buyer (the value of  for supplier i ). A supplier who 
knows that his fit level is relatively low strategically lowers his bid to remain attractive to the 
buyer. Furthermore, a supplier who knows his fit is relatively high must lower his bid to compete 
with these low-fit/low-bidding suppliers.  
ix
Several successful online procurement service firms exercise some form of information 
revelation in their RFQ process. For example, the firm Frictionless Commerce relies heavily on 
informing bidders of the score or ranking of bidders in terms of meeting the demands of the 
buyer (Beil & Wein, 2003).23  The principle for information revelation in auctions holds as well 
for the buyer conducting her own RFQ. But if the intermediary recruits more bidders at a lower 
scrutiny level, information revelation becomes more important for the intermediary to remain a 
beneficial alternative for the buyer. 
                                                 
22 See FreeMarkets OnLine, 1998, Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-598-109. 
23 There are other examples. Sorcity.com encourages two-way communication between the buyer and the qualified 
suppliers. And, as noted previously, FreeMarkets offers potential suppliers free RFQ support to help them know 
their match with the buyer’s specific requirements. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
We have developed a theoretical model to explain the source of profitability and the related 
behavior of an intermediary who organizes Internet-based auction to source the inputs required 
by its clients.  We identify as a source of profitability for the intermediary its ability to 
administer efficiently reverse-auctions on behalf of its clients using, for instance, Internet-based 
e-sourcing software. We also use this model to offer strategies that might improve the 
profitability of the intermediary with regard to bidder recruitment and information revelation to 
the participating suppliers. We show that the intermediary is more likely to be profitable when it 
can recruit a larger number of bidders, relative to the buyer’s own optimal number, and when it 
can reveal to each bidder his degree of fit before the auction takes place.   
 We also point out that the profitability of the intermediary depends on how successful the 
buyer can be when she procures the input herself, since this defines the buyer’s outside option. In 
contrast to the intermediary, it might be optimal for the buyer to conceal information from 
suppliers when there is a small number of potential suppliers and search costs are relatively low. 
In this latter case, if the buyer searches on her own she does it sequentially, one supplier at a 
time. 
 Our model is based upon several simplifying assumptions.  In future research, we wish to 
investigate whether the results are sensitive to those assumptions.  It will be useful to investigate, 
for instance, whether the results change if the distribution of fitness types is not uniform or if 
suppliers differ also in terms of their costs of production.  As well, we have restricted attention to 
only one type of auction in the analysis.  In the future, we wish to consider alternative types such 
as second price, sealed bid and open auctions.  We do not expect our main result concerning the 
role of information to be significantly altered.  As in the first-price, sealed bid auction, we expect 
suppliers to bid more aggressively when they are fully aware of their fit parameters. 
 Another simplifying assumption, which is made in our formulation of buyer search, is 
that previously contacted suppliers cannot strategically change their price upon contact again 
from the buyer.  Relaxing this assumption might presumably put downward pressure on prices. 
This might occur, for instance, when the buyer wishes to return to a previously contacted 
supplier and use other quotes to put pressure on him to lower his originally quoted price. On the 
other hand, if the supplier anticipates the possible return of the buyer, he might shade his 
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originally quoted price upward. Which effect dominates leaves an open question for future 
research aimed at a better understanding of search behavior.  
 Finally, we have not considered here the effect of competitive threats to the 
intermediary’s profitability. In a previous working paper version of this manuscript we consider 
two possible threats. In one instance, there might exist competing intermediaries who are either 
more cost efficient in their auction administration or offer a better share of the efficiency gains to 
their customers. Ellison et al (2003) and Santos & Scheinkman (2001) present recent research on 
competing auctions and exchanges, respectively. Their approach might provide additional 
answers to questions concerning competing intermediaries. 
 In a second instance, suppliers might strategically bypass the intermediary and approach 
the buyer directly through, for instance, advertising. Such behavior on the part of the supplier 
reduces the search costs of the buyer and consequently reduces the potential of the intermediary 
to add value to the procurement process. (A simple, but formal analysis of this scenario appears 
in the previous working paper and is available upon request.) 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(i), (ii) Using the expression for  from (4), we can obtain the objective function of supplier  
as follows: 
*
ix i
i
i
iii pm
pp
m
kpxE ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+=−= ˆ2)1( *π .      (A.1) 
Optimizing with respect to  we get: ip
02
ˆ2 =−+=∂
∂
m
pp
m
k
p
E i
i
iπ .        (A.2) 
Substituting symmetry into (A.2), we obtain that kmpppi 2ˆ ===  as stated in (6). Similarly, 
substituting  symmetry into (4) yields the minimal acceptable level (5).  
If the buyer sampled already one supplier her expected payoff from following the above 
mentioned stopping rule designated by , can be expressed as follows: Ew
 ))((Pr)][()(Pr *** kEwxxpxxxmExxEw −<+−≥≥= .    (A.3) 
If the current supplier is of type greater than  the buyer purchases from her.  Otherwise, she 
pays the extra search cost k, at which point she faces the same environment once again.  Solving 
for  yields: 
*x
Ew
 kkmm
x
kxpxmEw +−=+−−
+= 22
)1(2
)1(
*
**
. 
The cost of sampling the first supplier is , implying that the expected payoff of the buyer, 
designated by , from following the sequential search method is given by (8). This expected 
payoff is non-negative if . Hence, only in this case the buyer will conduct the search for 
the input in order to participate in production. 
k
Ev
8/mk ≤
 To find the expected profits of each supplier, substitute the solution for p  into (A.1) to 
obtain (7).            Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
First we show that if the buyer sampled already one supplier, say supplier , i mxxpxpi == )(ˆ)(  
is an equilibrium. If the buyer expects the price schedule of all suppliers other than i  to be 
 she has no incentive to continue her search since she anticipates a negative payoff 
from such an activity. In response to the buyer’s anticipated absence of search, supplier i  raises 
his price to extract the entire surplus of the buyer, implying that 
mxxp =)(ˆ
mxxpxpi == )(ˆ)( . Given such 
anticipated pricing by the suppliers the buyer withdraws from the market altogether. 
 Next we show that if the function )(ˆ)(ˆ xpmxxv −≡  is monotone, the above mentioned 
pricing by the suppliers is the unique equilibrium, assuming that the buyer has already sampled 
one supplier. We show this result under the assumption that  is always non-decreasing. A 
similar proof applies when  is assumed to be always non-increasing. The differential 
equation (10) characterizes the symmetric equilibrium, given that the buyer has already observed 
the fit parameter of one supplier. Define, 
)(ˆ xv
)(ˆ xv
  ( ) ( )∫= 1
x
dttpxy
implying that 
 . ( ) ( )xpxy −=′
 Substituting into (10) yields: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )x
k
x
xyxmxy −−−−
−=′
112
1 .       (A.4) 
To solve (A.4) we first derive the solution to the homogenous differential equation: 
 ( ) ( )( )x
xyxy −
−=′
1
.         (A.5) 
The function , with )1()( xTxz −= T  as the constant of integration, is the general solution to 
(A.5). Using the variation of coefficient method we conjecture that the solution to (A.4) is 
.  Substituting this conjecture back into (A.4) yields a differential equation in 
 as follows: 
)1)(()( xxTxy −=
)(xT
 2)1(2
)(
x
kmxT −−=′ .         (A.6) 
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The general solution of (A.6) is 
 R
x
kmxxT +−−= )1(2)( , 
where R is a constant of integration.  Hence the general solution for  that solves (A.4) is: )(xy
 )1(
2
)1()( xRkxmxxy −+−−= . 
From the definition of  if follows, therefore, that  )(xy
 ( ) mxmRxp +−=
2
, and ( ) ( ) Rmxpmxxv −=−=
2
. 
Since the solution yields a flat net-payoff function that is independent of x, the buyer will not 
find it optimal to search, thus leading to the proposed equilibrium in which the supplier sampled 
extracts the complete surplus of the buyer. As a result, the buyer does not find it optimal to incur 
the cost k  that is necessary in order to inspect the first supplier.    Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Optimizing (11) with respect to  yields the first order condition: ip
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Evaluating the above integrals and substituting symmetry into (A.7), yields the solution for the 
common price given in (12). Substituting this common price back into (11) yields the expected 
payoff of each supplier. The expected payoff of the buyer when  is derived as follows: 2≥n
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…
 
Evaluating the above integral yields (14).         Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Optimizing (15) with respect to  yields the following first order condition when : ( )ii xp 2≥n
  ( )( )
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At the symmetric equilibrium, ( ) ( ) ( )xpxpxp i ˆ=≡  implying that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xpmxxvxvxv i −==≡ ˆ , 
and ( )( ) ( )( iiiiiii xxpmxvxpmxv =−=− −− 11ˆ ) .  Substituting into (A.8) yields 
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Since  we obtain the following first order differential equation in . ( ) ( )ii xpmxv ′−=′ ( )⋅p
 ( ) ( )( )( )( ) 0
ˆ1ˆ
2
1 =′−
−−−−
−
−
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Rearranging terms we obtain: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )xx
nxpmxp
ˆ
1
−
−−=′ .        (A.9) 
We first solve the homogenous equation 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )xx
n
xp
xp
ˆ
1
−
−−=′  
to obtain the general solution ( ) ( ) ( )1ˆ −−−= nxxTxp .  Using the variation of coefficient method, we 
conjecture that the solution of (A.9) takes the form ( ) ( )( ) ( )1ˆ −−−= nxxxTxp .  Substituting into 
(A.9) we obtain the following differential equation in ( )xT : 
 . ( ) ( ) 1ˆ −−=′ nxxmxT
The general solution for  is: ( )xT
 ( ) ( ) R
n
xxmxT
n
+−= ˆ , 
where R is a constant of integration.  Hence, the general solution to (A.9) is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1ˆ
ˆ
−−+
−= nxx
R
n
xxmxp . 
Notice first that , otherwise the price would be negative for x values close to .  As well, 
the net payoff of the buyer has to be nonnegative, implying that 
0≥R xˆ
0=R .  Otherwise, 
.  Hence, the nonnegative price schedule that satisfies the first order condition 
(A.9) for all  is: 
( ) −∞→→ xvxx ˆlim
xx ˆ≥
 ( ) ( )
n
xxmxp
ˆ−= ,         (A.10) 
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yielding the net payoff function of the buyer: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
n
xm
n
xnm
n
xxmmxxv
ˆ1ˆ +−=−−= .      (A.11) 
This payoff function is strictly increasing, thus confirming our initial assumption concerning the 
shape of the function . The expected payoff of each supplier is obtained by substituting  
from (A.10) back into (15). The expected payoff of the buyer is obtained as follows: 
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            Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
When , , implying that sequential search dominates RFQ if 0ˆ =x nknxTCB =),ˆ(
 nk
n
nmkmm −+
−>−
)1(
)1(22 . 
The above inequality can be rewritten as 
 0
)1()1(
)2(
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>+++
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n
mmk
n
nknkT .      (A.12) 
Solving the above quadratic expression when equal to zero yields the roots  and . When 
,  and when , 
Lk Hk
5≤n 8/mkH > 6≥n 8/mkH ≤ , which yields the conclusion stated in the 
Proposition. (See Figure 1.)         Q.E.D. 
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Figure 1 Relative Profitability of Sequential Search versus RFQ 
 
Appendix 2  
In this Appendix, we consider a model with partial information sharing between the buyer and 
the suppliers.  Specifically, the buyer decides probabilistically on whether to inform the suppliers 
about her specifications.  As well, the probability of informing one supplier is independent of the 
probability of informing others.  Let α  designate the probability that the buyer will inform a 
given supplier.  We will demonstrate that at the symmetric equilibrium with , the price 
chosen by the suppliers is higher than that selected when 
2≥n
1=α .  Hence, partial sharing yields 
less intense price competition among suppliers than complete information sharing. 
 Let  designate the price schedule chosen by supplier  if the buyer informs him and 
let 
( )xp i
p  designate the (constant) price he chooses if he is uninformed, then ( ) ]ˆ[ xxxpEp ≥=   Let 
 and  designate the corresponding prices selected by all suppliers other than  at the 
symmetric equilibrium.  Supplier i  expects to win the auction when he is informed if the 
following system of  inequalities holds: 
( )xpˆ pˆ i
( 1−n )
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .,ˆ1ˆ ijpxpmxxpmx jjii ≠−−−≥− αα  (B.1) 
The RHS of (B.1) reflects the fact that supplier  is uncertain of whether his competitors are 
informed.  The probability of the event expressed by (B.1) is 
i
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where the function  is defined as follows: )(⋅H
 ( ) ( )xpmxxH ˆα−≡ . 
Assuming that the function  is strictly increasing, supplier  chooses his price  to 
maximize his expected payoff as follows: 
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Optimizing (B.2) yields the following first order condition: 
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where  and ( )ii xpp = ( ) ( )( ).ˆ11 ppmxHpY iii α−+−≡ −    
The second order condition requires that 022 <∂∂ ipL , which holds provided that .  At 
the symmetric equilibrium  and 
0≤′′H
( ) ( )xpxp ˆ= ( )( ) EpxxxpEpp ≡≥== ˆˆ .  Substituting symmetry 
into (B.3) yields: 
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 Next, we assume that the price schedule that solves (B.4) is identical to that obtained in 
the main text when 1=α .  Specifically ( ) ( )
n
xxmxp
ˆ−=  and ( ) ( ).
2
ˆ1]ˆ[
n
xmxxxpEEp −=≥≡  
Assuming this solution yields that: 
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Note that the assumed solution satisfies the conditions that 0>′H  and 0≤′′H .  From (B.5) it 
follows that: 
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Substituting (B.5) and (B.6) back into the LHS of (B.4) yields: 
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 if 1<α . 
Since the derivative is strictly positive when 1<α  and since 022 <∂∂ ipL  it follows that the 
solution for  at the symmetric equilibrium is strictly bigger than the assumed solution.  
Hence, partial information sharing yields alleviated price competition in comparison to complete 
sharing when 
( )xp
1=α .  Since the buyer benefits from intensified price competition among 
suppliers, she will always find it optimal to fully inform them (i.e. 1=α .) 
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